Beyond the BrahMos failure

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has done itself little good by claiming success in its test-firing of the BrahMos missile, till the media exposed the bogus nature of the claim. Even if the DRDO’s position is accepted that the performance of the missile was normal till the last phase, when it began malfunctioning, the fact that a weapon meant to hit a precisely identified target missed the target completely leaves little room for quibbling on the middle ground between between success and failure. Admittedly, such fiascos are not uncommon when it comes to sophisticated technological systems. But when such failures become frequent, as is the case with the DRDO, a proper investigation into the causes is called for, especially when the organisation’s claims about successes betray an unwillingness to look the facts in the eye.

It is worth noting that the Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro), a similar publicly-funded research and development body, carried out recently the relatively more sophisticated Chandrayaan-1 moon mission with copybook precision in its maiden flight. Isro and the DRDO, therefore, represent studies in contrast. While Isro too has suffered failures, it has not tried to hide them. The best case in point would be the coincidental back-to-back mishaps of the Agni-III missile of the DRDO and the GSLV-FO2 satellite vehicle of Isro, both of which drowned in the sea on successive days in July 2006. Isro was forthright in admitting the failure and setting up a high-level probe, whereas DRDO even then maintained that the take-off was successful and the problem arose only subsequently. The scientific temper, as reflected in intellectual honesty, openness and dedication to work, that one finds in Isro seems missing in DRDO. Good project management, one of the significant factors in the Chandrayaan’s success, also seems to be wanting in DRDO, where projects routinely face cost and time over-runs, and even then failure to deliver the promised weapon systems. It is no wonder then that while DRDO fiddles with its projects, the defence services have to fall back on expensive imports.

Perhaps the comparisons are unfair to DRDO, which has to deal with a much wider array of technologies and more complex issues than Isro, which has a single-point objective and is mostly its own client (unlike DRDO, which is supposed to serve a largely sceptical defence establishment). But even when it comes to just missiles, there are instances of the DRDO giving up projects after working on them for years, and spending crores of rupees. The aborted bid to develop the surface-to-air Trishul missile was one such case. Not very different was the case of two other missile systems, Akash and Nag. Of the five missile systems that DRDO was to deliver, it can claim some success only with the long-range Agni and short-range Prithvi, though even these have had their problems—one result being that Pakistan has clear advantages when it comes to missile defence. In sharp contrast, Isro has delivered on the Chandrayaan mission at a low cost of under Rs 400 crore, the cheapest moon mission in the world, and now nurtures the ambition of putting a man in space and subsequently on the moon. The starting point of change has to be the recognition of one’s own shortcomings. That become difficult when DRDO wants to claim that failures are successes